JUDICON project members presented a paper at the 2020 APSA Annual Meeting. The conference was held on-line (9-13 September 2020).
Pócza, Kálmán – Dobos, Gábor – Gyulai, Attila – Papp, Zsófia:
The Effects of Budgetary Implications and Party Politics on Judicial Review
In the past thirty years, with the global spread of judicial review, constitutional courts became important political actors. At the same time, evidence suggests that courts have been reluctant to adjudicate on issues with heavy budgetary implications. Furthermore, the political leaning of the judges also influences decisions making courts more cautious of criticizing governments or, quite the contrary, constraining the government’s room to manoeuvre. The analysis looks at the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court between 1990 and 2018. It is found that on the one hand, the potential budgetary consequences of a decision do not weigh in with the judicial output, but on the other hand, there is a certain policy salience in the courts’ practice. Furthermore, right-leaning courts are more likely to declare laws unconstitutional that were passed at times of left-wing government majorities in parliament, whereas left-wing courts adjudicate unconstitutionality with about roughly the same likelihood in the cases of right- and left-leaning parliaments. Our results highlight that while the Hungarian Constitutional Court does not narrow the parliamentary majority’s room to manoeuvre by blocking policies with serious budgetary consequences, bloc-politics is still not alien from it.